HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES
HAVING discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and
having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
offence and defence which belong to each of them.
We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to
ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws
where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well
armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion
and shall speak of the arms.
I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state
are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds
his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for
they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful,
valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the
fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so
long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by
the enemy. The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for
keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to
make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your
soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take
themselves off or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble
to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by
resting all her hopes for many years on mercenaries, and although they
formerly made some display and appeared valiant amongst themselves, yet
when the foreigners came they showed what they were. Thus it was that
Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand;
[1] and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the
truth, but they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have
related. And as they were the sins of princes, it is the princes who
have also suffered the penalty.
I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The
mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they are,
you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others
contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are
ruined in the usual way.
And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to,
either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person
and perform the duty of captain; the republic has to send its citizens,
and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to
recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he
does not leave the command. And experience has shown princes and
republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress, and mercenaries
doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult to bring a
republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of its citizens
than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and Sparta stood
for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely armed and
quite free.
Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the
Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains.
After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of
their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took away their
liberty.
Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against
the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, allied
himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father,
Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of Naples, left her
unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into the arms of
the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the Venetians
and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and yet
their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them,
I reply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance,
for of the able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some
have not conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their
ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto, [2] and
since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one
will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have
stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him,
so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy;
Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to
that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines appointed as
their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who from a private
position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man had taken Pisa,
nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the Florentines to
keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had
no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The
Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have
acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men,
when with armed gentlemen and plebeians they did valiantly. This was
before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight
on land they forsook this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And
in the beginning of their expansion on land, through not having much
territory, and because of their great reputation, they had not much to
fear from their captains; but when they expanded, as under Carmignola,
they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant
man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the
other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they
would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not
willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again
that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure
themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their captains
Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count of Pitigliano,
and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as
happened afterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost that which
in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because
from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and
inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.
And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in
order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more
temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for
the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their
nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were oppressing them,
whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain authority in temporal
power: in many others their citizens became princes. From this it came
to pass that Italy fell partly into the hands of the Church and of
republics, and, the Church consisting of priests and the republic of
citizens unaccustomed to arms, both commenced to enlist foreigners.
The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio, a
native of the Romagna. From the school of this man sprang, among others,
Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After
these came all the other captains who till now have directed the arms of
Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has been
overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted
by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been, first, to
lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase their own. They
did this because, subsisting on their pay and without territory, they
were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did not give
them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate
force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were
brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers,
there were not to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides
this, used every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and
their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and
liberating without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did
the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not
surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign
in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military rules,
and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers;
thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.
1. With which to chalk up the billets for his soldiers.
2. As Sir John Hawkwood, the English leader of mercenaries, was called
by the Italians.